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ABSTRACT
Human groups show a variety of leadership structures from no leader, to changing leaders, to a single
long-term leader. When a leader is deposed, the presence of a power vacuum can mean they are often
quickly replaced. We lack an explanation of how such phenomena can emerge from simple rules of
interaction between individuals. Here, we model transitions between different phases of leadership
structure. We find a novel class of group dynamical behaviour where there is a single leader who is
quickly replaced when they lose status, demonstrating a power vacuum. The model uses a dynamic
network of individuals who non-coercively form and break alliances with one-another, with a key
parameter modelling inequality in these alliances. We argue the model can explain transitions in
leadership structure in the Neolithic Era from relatively equal hunter-gatherer societies, to groups with
chieftains which change over time, to groups with an institutionalised leader on a paternal lineage.
Our model demonstrates how these transitions can be explained by the impact of technological
developments such as food storage and/or weapons, which meant that alliances became more unequal.
In general terms, our approach provides a quantitative understanding of how technology and social
norms can affect leadership dynamics and structures.
Keywords Leadership dynamics, network analysis, dynamic coevolutionary networks
1 Introduction
Recent changes of the law in China and Turkey mean that their current leaders (President Xi Jinping and President
Recep Tayyip Erdogˆan respectively) may hold onto their positions indefinitely. Conversely, in other countries the leader
may change relatively often; for instance the UK has had five different Prime Ministers between the years 2007-2019.
Among smaller groups some, such as private companies, have a permanent leader while other groups, such as university
departments or social societies, have more transient and flexible leadership structures.
∗Corresponding author John Bryden (john.bryden@rhul.ac.uk).
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A notable feature of many human groups is that they often do not explicitly coerce their members to join a hierarchy.
Instead, soft power and prestige play a strong role [1, 2], with status being an abstraction of more tangible material
resources such as land, food, weapons or other commodities [3]. Status is then voluntarily conferred upon leaders by
those they are allied with [4, 5, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 2], with many of these alliances being asymmetric [10, 5, 9, 2, 11]. The
member with the highest status usually deemed the leader [4, 6, 8, 2], creating hierarchical societies. What is not clear,
however, is what factors determine why some groups have no leader, others have transient leaders and yet others have
relatively permanent leaders.
A notable example of a shift between different forms of leadership dynamics is found from evidence from the Neolithic
Era. Before this era, human societies consisted of egalitarian hunter-gatherer groups where material resources such
as food were shared relatively equally [12] and leadership roles were facultative and of a temporary duration. There
followed a transition to sedentary groups where high-status individuals had more resources but leaders still changed
relatively regularly [13]. Finally, hereditary leadership became institutionalised, where the role of a chief was passed
down a paternal line, which monopolised most of the resources [14]. Many scholars argue that these shifts were due
to social and technological developments, which meant that interactions between individuals became increasingly
asymmetric. These asymmetries were likely due to control of agricultural surpluses [15, 16, 17, 18], land [15],
ideologies [19], or military units and weapons [14]. In light of this evidence, the model we present here investigates
how asymmetry in status interaction can generate the different classes of leadership dynamics observed during the
Neolithic Era.
Network analysis has proved to be a useful approach for studying the interactions of members of a population [3, 20, 7].
Quantitative study of hierarchical networks studied is usually static in nature and they are presented as snapshots in time
[21, 22]. However, members of a population will often change their properties and who they interact with over time.
Recently, a number of studies have concentrated on the dynamical properties of networks [23, 24]. To look at the factors
behind different types of leadership dynamics, we build on this work to model a dynamic coevolutionary network which
incorporates the status of individuals as properties of the nodes and links between individuals representing alliances.
2 Model
The model consists of a dynamic network of n individuals and is based on the following five assumptions: 1. individuals
are equivalent to one another in every way and are unable to coerce one another to form alliances; 2. each individual
has a status level which depends on their associations with others, meaning that status is adjusted according to the status
of those who they are linked to; 3. individuals share a proportion of their status amongst those they are linked with; 4.
status can be asymmetrically passed from one individual to another; 5. individuals can change who they associate with
according to the marginal utility of the associations.
Each individual i maintains a status si which translates to how much influence they have within the group. Status acts
as a multivariate aggregate of an individual’s level of money, prestige (titles, jobs, etc), and ownership (land, valuable
resources, etc). We assume that, to participate in society, an individual must maintain relationships where they choose a
fixed number (constant for all individuals) of associations with other individuals. Consequently, in our model, each
individual is given λ unidirectional ‘outgoing’ links which are assigned to others in a network. Individuals can have any
number of ‘incoming’ links from others in the network.
The statuses of the individuals are updated according to their links in the status update stage, and individuals are then
given an opportunity to rewire their links in the rewiring stage. The model is then run forward in time to observe
the distribution of status and changes of that distribution amongst the individuals. We especially looked for ‘leader’
individuals with high status and checked to see whether they were superceded by other leaders. We ran models until
patterns of leadership dynamics had stabilised, or for a substantially long time (up to 5 million time steps) to check that
new leaders were extremely unlikely to rise to high status.
Status update stage: In the model, a proportion of r of each individual’s status is shared amongst each of its links
(including both incoming and outgoing links). This formalisation of sharing status amongst links is based on Katz’s
prestige measure [25]. For each link, we calculate that link’s status by adding the status contribution from the outgoing
individual (for whom the link is outgoing) to the status contribution from the incoming individual. To model unequal
alliances we introduce the inequality parameter q which reassigns the link’s status back to those linked to unequally.
A proportion q of a link’s status is assigned to the incoming individual, with a proportion (1− q) remaining with the
outgoing individual. In this formulation, the total amount of status in the model is constant, and because every status is
initialised at si = 1.0, the sum always equals n, i.e.,
∑
i si = n.
Rewiring phase: In order to maximise status, each individual determines the outgoing link which is worth the least
value to itself. This link is rewired randomly, with probability w, to an individual with whom they are not currently
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Figure 1: A plot of the network showing a single individual with a high level of status compared to the others. Individuals
with higher status are lighter coloured and have larger circles.
linked. The assumption of random rewiring reflects the fact that an individual is unlikely to be able to tell the value of
an association with another until they have formed the link.
3 Results
In the following, we will present our analysis of the dynamics that result from the interplay between the processes
outlined above. Simulations were run of the model choosing parameter values over a complete range. Depending on the
parameters, we either observe relatively equal statuses among the population, or a relatively high status level for one or
a few individuals. An example of a typical network with a single dominant individual can be seen in Fig. 1.
A key parameter in the model is the inequality parameter (q), which models an unequal transfer of status from a link
originator to a link receiver. This parameter can represent how social and technological development in the Neolithic
Era created inequalities in interactions. As we increase q, theory predicts different phases of dynamics in the model,
which are shown in Fig. 2. We dub the individual with the highest level of status as the leader. We find three different
types of leadership dynamics in the model: No leader, transient leader(s), and permanent leader(s).
The dynamics shown in Fig. 2 panel B indicate that as one leader is removed, this can create a power vacuum which
leads to a new leader quickly gaining status. We have produced a video animation of the model of this phase of the
model which is available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=LrQWDhjwsYA. To investigate how the model transitions in
and out of this phase, we looked in more detail at how the numbers of leaders and the lengths of time that they were
leaders varied over different levels of the inequality parameter (q). We calculated the distributions of the different
numbers of leaders over a threshold status level (si > 3.0) and the median length of time new leaders stay over the
threshold after they have become the highest status individual. These are plotted in Fig. 3 with varying numbers of
links originating from each individual (λ). The plot demonstrates there are ranges of the inequality parameter (q)
where leader turnover is relatively high, but the number of leaders is relatively constant. This shows that there is a
power-vacuum effect in our model.
To understand the dynamics created by the model in more detail, we compare them to a simpler model of a branching
process. Branching processes specify the rates at which an individual with xi links acquires or loses links. In such
processes, we observe a power-law distribution of the number of links when the link gain rate is close to the loss rate.
We observe such a power law distribution when this is the case in our model (see Fig. 4, panel A). The formation of a
hump in the distribution to the right is also consistent with branching processes with a reflecting boundary. However,
the results suggest our model is not simply a superposition of branching processes for each individual. A superposition
would not explain why we find a power vacuum effect, where there is always a leader which changes identity over
time (see, e.g., Fig. 3, q = 0.532, λ = 3). The reason the power vacuum happens is because the presence of a leader
suppresses the others (see Fig. 4 panel B), which is due to the relatively high number of links to the leader.
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Figure 2: Increasing the inequality takes the model through five different phases. First there is effectively no leader at
all (panel A). Then we see that a single individual can rise to a high leadership status, but this is transient and leaders are
replaced by other individuals (panel B). The length of time that individuals stay as leader then increases as we increase
q until the leader is effectively permanently in charge (panel C). In the next phase, a second individual can rise to a high
status alongside the first leader, but these individuals’ leadership position is transient (panel D). Finally, two individuals
share leadership status and remain so permanently (panel E). The value of q is shown, other parameters are r = 0.2,
n = 50, λ = 3, w = 0.5.
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Figure 3: During transient periods, as one leader loses status, another quickly replaces it. Increasing the inequality
parameter increases the time that leaders stay above the status level. The lines in panel A show the mean numbers of
leaders over a threshold status level throughout a complete run of the model. For each value of q, vertical boxes indicate
the relative proportion of timesteps with each number of leaders, for instance the width of ≈ 0.98 at q = 0.532 and
λ = 3 indicates that there was generally only one leader above the threshold throughout the simulation. Panel B shows
the mean time that an individual stays above the threshold after they have reached highest status.Leader turn over was
quite high at q = 0.532 with the average leader lasting 7000 time steps with simulations run over 2 million time steps.
Parameters as in Fig. 2 unless shown.
In order to check whether our model is consistent with evidence from the Neolithic Era, we looked to see if the increase
in leadership time-length is consistent over a wide range of parameters and that our results can be found in large groups.
We ran simulations over a wide range of parameters to investigate the role of each parameter on the dynamics. Over
each simulation run, we recorded the number of times there was a change of leader. We counted new leaders when they
hadn’t been one of the previous l − 1 leaders. Our results confirm that as we increased the inequality parameter, we
recorded fewer leaders as individuals spend longer time periods as leader. The full range of parameters are presented in
the Supplementary Material (see Figures S1-9).
4 Discussion
The model presented here demonstrates a rich set of leadership structure dynamics amongst individuals in a non-coercive
environment. The model reveals an interesting phase where competition to be leader is suppressed by the temporary
presence of one leader, meaning that when a leader loses status it will be quickly replaced. We show how the dynamics
can depend on the level of inequality of alliances between individuals, and on the numbers of alliances an individual can
form. This suggests that technology and social norms can modulate such a system and implies that self-organisation in a
society can play a role in keeping a system near to an equilibrium point where leadership changes relatively frequently.
This work pushes forward our understanding of hierarchies in human networks. This is currently largely based on static
networks which are formed by preferential-attachment where nodes are more likely to connect to other nodes which
5
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Figure 4: Frequency distributions of the numbers of links to individuals demonstrate how individuals show critical
behaviour of a branching process over a range of values of q (panel A. There is a truncated power law distribution with
exponent ≈ −8.0 on panel A at a relatively low level of q = 0.525. At higher levels of q we can see how dominant
individuals will suppress others to subcritical behaviour (panel B). We can see how the rewiring of links to an extra
leader between q = 0.54 and q = 0.55 (see Fig. 3 panel A) suppresses the frequencies of individuals with mid-range
number of links as q is increased. Parameters are the same as in Fig. 2, q as shown. Simulations were run over 2 million
time steps.
are already of high status [22]. Our model presents an alternative where the hierarchy is dynamic: nodes have high
numbers of connections (alliances) at some points and then other nodes take over.
This work also contributes new insights into the Neolithic transitions in human societies from relatively flat power
structures, through a period where leaders changed over time, to dominant institutionalised leaders [13]. Our model
presents a potential explanation for this, given that status would be closely linked to control of food or other mo-
nopolisable resources. Contemporary to the political transitions were innovations in agriculture, which enabled a
high status individual to control a large food surplus. These high status individuals were able to feed a large number
of supporters at relatively little cost to themselves, for example funding a military, enabling them to maintain and
eventually institutionalise their power. Monopolisable resources could also be less tangible, such as religious authority
[19] however the evidence suggests these changes followed technological advances [26]. In either case, the growth of
population size and the transition to a sedentary, agricultural, lifestyle would have made it more difficult for followers to
leave their group and hence easier for a dominant individual to monopolise [15, 27]. These factors, especially the ability
to monopolise resources, relate to a high level of the inequality parameter (q) in our model as the leader individual is
able to form alliances where they exchange a small proportion of these resources to gain loyalty from their supporters.
The three phases of human leadership dynamics correspond to three phases identified in the organisational psychology
literature. Lewin has identified three modes of leadership: Laissez Faire, Democratic and Autocratic [28]. In this
analysis, the Laissez Faire mode was found to be the case where there is no central resource to coordinate and
corresponds to the no-leader phase. When there is a central resource, our model predicts that those individuals with
higher status are able to control this central resource, and thus not lose out when more individuals join their group. This
is because a controlled surplus of this central resource enables a leader to pay off many individuals and maintain their
leadership [29]. The ability to control a central resource means that such groups will switch from the Laissez Faire
mode to more Democratic and Autocratic modes.
In this paper we focussed primarily on applying this model to develop insights regarding the Neolithic transitions from
flat power structures to hierarchical societies. Future work can build upon these foundations to examine whether this
6
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model can be applied to other changes in societal structure, such as the movements from monarchy toward parliamentary
democracies in 18th-century Europe, or the transitions of Roman civilization betwween monarchy, through annually
electing two concurrent consuls in the Roman Republic, to a single Imperator Caesar in the Roman Empire. Other work
might investigate the impact of relaxing some of our assumptions. For instance, exploring different rewiring rules where
individuals have different numbers of links, or rewire to others based on a similar or higher levels of status or numbers
of links. The model also can be extended in various ways to better represent the real-world contexts in which leadership
dynamics operate; these could include representations of technological innovations, changes in social norms, or power
struggles between potential leaders. These extensions would enable us to develop the model further into a powerful
exploratory tool for human leadership dynamics.
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